Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

Barbara Susan Forsman v. John Fredrick Forsman :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jane Allen; attorney for appellee.
David J. Berceau; attorney for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Forsman v. Forsman, No. 920788 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4799

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

ITAH
IOCUMENT
0
MO
>OCKET NO.

onitr

$Zfr?f&&Ar

mim&f

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BARBARA SUSAN FORSMAN

)

Plaintiff and Appellee
-vsJOHN FREDERICK FORSMAN
Defendant and Appellant

)
)

Appeals Case No. 920788-CA
Dist. Court Case No.894901230
Priortiy 15

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from a Order on Order to Show Cause of the Third District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable Pat Brian

DAVID J. BERCEAU, P.C.
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
243 East 400 South, Suite 303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
JANE ALLEN
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
310 South Main, Suite 1305
Salt Lake Ctiy, Utah 84101

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

MAY 2 0 1993

(/•
r

Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BARBARA SUSAN FORSMAN

)

Plaintiff and Appellee
-vsJOHN FREDERICK FORSMAN

)
)

Appeals Case No. 920788-CA
Dist. Court Case No.894901230
Priortiy 15

)

Defendant and Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from a Order on Order to Show Cause of the Third District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable Pat Brian

DAVID J. BERCEAU, P.C.
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
243 East 400 South, Suite 303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
JANE ALLEN
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
310 South Main, Suite 1305
Salt Lake Ctiy, Utah 84101

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

A

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

1

STATEMENT OF CASE

1

NATURE OF CASE

1

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

2

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

5

ARGUMENT

6

CONCLUSION

11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

•

ADDENDUM
1.

TRANSCRIPT

2.

UTAH CODE ANN., 30-3-5(3) (1953 as amended)

3.

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULE 201

4.

UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, RULE 6-404

12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Anderson v. Anderson. 585 P.2d 938 (Hawaii 1978)

9

Chavez v. Chavez. 485 P.2d 735 (N.M. 1971)

6

Delancey v. Delancey. 714 P.2d 32 (Idaho 1986)

6

Grover v. Grover. 839 P.2d 871 (Utah App. 1992)

1

Huble v. Cache Co. Drainage Dist. No. 3. 259
P.2d 893 (Utah 1953)

8

In Re Marriage of Jarvis. 792 P.2d 1254 (Wash. App. 1990)

1

Land v. Land. 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980)

8

Lord v. Shaw. 682 P.2d 853 (Utah 1984)

7

Salt Lake City v. Telluride Power Co.. 17 P.2d
281 (Utah 1932)

8

Whitehouse v. Whitehouse. 790 P.2d 57 (Utah App. 1990)

1

CONSTITUTION
Utah Const. Art. VIII, Sec. 5

1

STATUTES & RULES
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2A-3(2)(i) (1953 as amended)

1

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-5(3) (1953 as amended)

1

Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 6-404

1

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 201

1

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(c)(2)

9

TEXTS
49 C.J.S. Judgments, Sec. 436(A)

(A)

7

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court pursuant to the
provisions of Utah Const. Art. VIII# Sec. 5, and Utah Code Ann.
78-2A-3 (2)(i).

(1953 as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE;

In its construction of a decree of divorce, the court

went beyond clarification resulting in a modification of decree
without petition and proof of material change in circumstance.
Standard

of

Review:

Correction

of

Error

Standard.

Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah App. 1990) , In Re
Marriage of Jarvis. 792 P.2d 1259 (Wash. App. 1990).

Grover v.

Grover, 834 P.2d 821 (Utah App. 1992).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES & RULES
1.
Addendum
2.

Utah

Code Ann.

Addendum

(1953 as amended).

See

2 .
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 201, Judicial Notice of

Adjudicative Facts.
3.

30-3-5(3)

See Addendum

3 .

Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 6-404.

See

4 .
STATEMENT OF CASE

A.

Nature of Case

Appellant challenges an order entered October 14, 1992 by
the Honorable Pat Brian pursuant to the recommendation of the
Honorable Commissioner Thomas Arnett made upon appellee's order
to show cause wherein the decree of divorce was construed to
provide that defendant pay real property taxes.
1

B.

Course of Proceedings

On August 8, 1989, the court entered the parties findings of
fact, conclusions of law and decree of divorce.

On July 21,

1992, the court issued an order to show cause which together with
appellees affidavit were servcid upon appellant on July 23, 1992.
The order to show cause was continued to September 24, 1992.

On

September 18, 1992, appellant mailed to appellee its response to
order to show cause and affidavit.

On September 24, 1992, the

Honorable Thomas Arnett heard the parties argument of plaintiff's
order to show cause.

The parties stipulated that but for the

issue whether defendant was obligated to pay real property taxes
all other issues were continued.
3.

Disposition at Trial Court

Commissioner Thomas Arnett construed the decree of divorce
as providing under the decree that appellant was obligated to pay
real property taxes.

On October 14, 1992, the Honorable Pat

Brian executed an order requiring appellant "pay all property
taxes accrued on the marital residence from the date of the
divorce

he

no

longer

had

possession

of the property".

On

November 13, 1992, defendant filed this appeal.
4.

Statement of Facts

On April 7, 1989, appellee filed her complaint for divorce.
(Record, pages 2, 3 & 4).
complaint as summoned to.

Appellant did not respond to the

On August 8, 1989, the court after a

hearing attended by appellee entered findings of fact,

2

conclusions of law and decree.

(Record, pages 8-13).

The decree

provisions relative to real property division and debt allocation
are mirror images of the relief as prayed by appellee in her
complaint.

The decree provides as follows:
a.

"The parties are purchasing the house and lot

located at 2268 So. 2300 E., possession of which shall be awarded
to the defendant, with the house to be listed for sale and sold
as soon as possible.

The defendant shall be required to maintain

the house and yard in a clean and neat condition to facilitate
the sale.

At sale the first mortgage shall be paid in full,

along with a home improvement loan to owed to Continental Bank.
The

remaining

proceeds,

if

any,

shall

be paid

towards

the

parties' debt to the IRS and Utah State, and if any proceeds
remain after that debt is paid, the parties shall share them
equally.

The defendant shall be responsible for all monthly

payments and utilities on the home until it is sold, holding the
plaintiff harmless therefrom.11
b.

"The plaintiff shall be responsible for one-half of

the monthly payment on the parties7 bankruptcy and one-half of
the debt to the State of Utah and the IRS, and any debts in her
name, holding the defendant harmless therefrom.

The defendant

shall be responsible for one-half of the monthly payment on the
parties' bankruptcy and one-half of the debt to the State of Utah
and the IRS, and any debts in his name, holding the plaintiff
harmless therefrom."

3

Appellee filed an order to show cause supported by affidavit
wherein she requested a judgment against defendant in the amount
of all past-due property taxes which defendant has failed to pay
which will be paid by plaintiff as soon as the house is sold.
(Record,

page

paragraph 3) .

16,

at

paragraph

8

and

Record,

page

20, at

In response thereto appellant alleged that he was

not ordered to pay property taxes.

The taxes were unpaid prior

to the decree and were to be paid when the house was sold.
(Record, page 23, paragraph B and Record, page 27, paragraph 5).
Upon hearing before the Honorable Commissioner Arnett, the
parties continued, except for the issue-who is responsible for
real property taxes-all other issues.
13) .

Appellee

in her argument

(Addendum 1 page 3, 1-

informed the court that the

mortgage payment did not include a payment for property taxes
(Addendum 1 page 3 at 11-13).

The appellee argued that since the

decree states that appellant should pay the monthly expenses that
this would include property taxes and plaintiff would owe taxes
accruing while appellant was in possession.

(Addendum 1, page 3,

22-25 and page 4, lines 1-3).
Appellant argued because the decree made no provision for
property taxes, the parties bound themselves to split the tax
obligation and appellee was asking the court to add phrases and
interpret a decree by retroactively modifying it to insert a
provision to say what happened to taxes wherein there is nothing
in the decree to say what happens.
4

Appellant stated the court

shouldn't add phrases into a decree. (Addendum 1, page 6, 1-25
and page 7, 1-20).
In its decision ordering appellant pay the real property
taxes, the court focused its interpretation of the decree upon
the decree provision that defendant shall be responsible for all
monthly payments and utilities on the home until it is sold
holding

the

plaintiff

harmless

therefrom.

The

court

took

judicial notice of the fact that mortgage companies and lending
institutions routinely treat both taxes and insurance as monthly
expenses

even

though

due

once per year.

The court stated

property taxes are ongoing expenses related to home ownership
even though payable once per year.

The court further stated as

rationale for its decision that defendant had the benefit of home
use.

The court stated that the decree neither delineated what

debts each party was to pay nor did the decree refer to property
taxes. (Addendum 1, page 8, 19-25, page 9, 1-13).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
In its application of general rules of construction, the
court

erred

because

the

decree

construction is impermissible.

is

unambiguous,

therefore,

Assuming the decree is ambiguous,

the intent of the court in entering the decree was to provide
only that relief as prayed which it did in clear language which
language can be given full force and effect without construction.
If the decree debt provisions imply anything they imply an intent
that all taxes be paid from the proceeds of sale and if not from
the parties equally.

The court's use of judicial notice was
5

improper and prejudicial because the facts taken notice of are
subject to reasonable dispute.

The court

in construing the

decree went beyond a clarification of existing terms resulting in
an expansion of the decree which is in effect a modification of
decree without petition and change of circumstance.
ARGUMENT
General

Rules

of

Construction

applicable

to

written

instruments and judgments apply to decrees of divorce.
v. Delancey, 714 P. 2d 32 (Idaho 1986).

Delancey

Chavez v. Chavez, 485

P.2d 735 (N.M. 1971) see, Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57
(Utah App. 1990) (Court used rules of construction in divorce
case).

Utah Courts also have continuing jurisdiction to make

subsequent changes or new orders for ...[d]ebts as is reasonable
and necessary.
The

party

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-5(3). (1953 as amended).

requesting

a modification

of

decree

must

file a

petition to modify the decree and may not proceed by means of an
order to show cause.
been

a material

Petitioner must demonstrate that there has

change of circumstances

occurring

decree not contemplated in the decree itself.
839 P.2d 871 (Utah App. 1992).

since the

Grover v. Grover,

Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790

P.2d 57 (Utah App. 1990).
In

the

case

at bar, appellant

contends that

the court

improperly construed the parties decree resulting in a modified
decree where

appellant

property taxes.

is ordered

to retroactively

pay real

Construction and modification are not the same.

The former presents a question of law to be determined from
6

examination of the decree itself to determine its intended effect
which may result in the courts clarification of the decree which
is merely a definition of the rights which have already been
given and those rights may be completely
court.

spelled out by the

The latter, modification, occurs when a party's rights

are either extended

beyond

intended in the decree.

or reduced

from those originally

In Re Marriage of Jarvis, 792 P.2d 1259

(Wash. App. 1990).
A.

Construction:

Parties are bound by the terms of their divorce decrees.
Lord v. Shaw, 682 P.2d 853 (Utah 1984).

When a divorce decree is

clear and unambiguous neither pleadings, findings nor matters
outside the record may be used to change its meaning or construe
it.

Chavez v. Chavez, 485 P.2d

language used

in a judgment

735

(N.M. 1971).

"If the

is ambiguous there is room for

construction, but if the language used is plain and unambiguous
there is no room for construction or interpretation and the
effect thereof must be declared in light of the literal meaning
of the language used."

49 C.J.S., Judgments, Sec. 436(A).

A

court is justified in determining that an order is ambiguous if
its terms are either unclear or missing.

Language in a written

document is ambiguous if the words used may be understood to
support

two

or

more

plausible

meanings.

Whitehouse

v.

Whitehguse, 790 P.2d 57 (Utah App. 1990).
The language sought defined by appellee upon examination is
not

ambiguous.

The

decree

at
7

paragraph

5

provides

that

defendant,

appellant,

shall

be

responsible

payments and utilities on the home until sold.

for

all

monthly

The words "All

monthly payments" are not susceptible of more than one meaning.
The words plainly
Appellee

and simply

describe payments

due monthly.

seeks another meaning to the words; namely, monthly

payments mean yearly real property taxes.

The mere fact that

another meaning is sought does not make the words ambiguous.
Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980).
court

given

there

is no ambiguity

Appellant urges this

to construe

the

language

literally.
Assuming the language is ambiguous, the court must construe
it in light of general rules of construction.

"In construing a

decree, it should be construed together as a whole so as to give
meaning

and

force

to

all

its terms,

and,

if

a

reasonable

construction can be had which will give force to all of its
wording, such a construction should be made."
Drainage Dist. No. 3, 259 P.2d 893 (Utah 1953).

Huble v. Cache Co.
"It is proper to

refer to pleadings in case in order to explain or limit the
language used in a decree."

Salt Lake City v. Telluride Power

Co. , 17 P.2d 281, (Utah 1932).

"The court should look to the

intent of the court entering the decree as gathered from the
decree and other evidence.

A judgment or decree like any other

written instrument is to be construed reasonably and as a whole.
Effect must be given not only to that which is expressed, but
also to that which is unavoidably and necessarily implied in the

8

judgment or decree."

Anderson v. Anderson, 585 P.2d 938 (Hawaii

1978) .
The decree debt provisions can be read as a whole with full
meaning, force and effect given to all terms without any resort
to

construction.

appellant

pay

The

all

decree

monthly

house

simply
and

provides
utility

as

follows:

payments; both

parties pay all debts in their names; the parties each pay 1/2 of
state & federal taxes; and if possible the state and federal
taxes are to be paid from real property sale proceeds.

It is

only when one seeks to add something to the decree such as debt
provisions relative to real property taxes that one needs to
construe the decree.
the

only

pleading

In reading the pleadings, the complaint is
of substance.

The complaint

reference to real property taxes whatsoever.

contains no

As a matter of law,

a court in awarding a default judgment cannot grant relief in
excess of that relief as prayed.
Rule 54(c)(a).

Utah Rules Civil Procedure,

Therefore, it is logical to conclude that the

court because it could not grant such relief: it did not intend
to

grant

the

parties

real

property

tax

relief.

If

any

implication can be drawn from the decree, it is that the court
intended for all taxes to be paid from the house proceeds, and if
unpaid, the parties were to each pay 1/2 of all taxes.
The extrinsic evidence; ie, judicial notice, utilized by the
court

to

construe

prejudicial.

the

decree

was

improper

evidence

and

The court took judicial notice of the fact that

mortgage companies and lending institutions routinely treat both
9

taxes and insurance as monthly payments even though due once per
year; therefore, monthly payments mean taxes and mortgage
payments.

Such

notice

is improper

because these

so called

adjudicative facts are subject to reasonable dispute.

See, Utah

Rules of Evidence, Rule 201.
parties

mortgage

at

issue,

Many mortgages, including the

do

not

have monthly

payments built into the monthly mortgage payment.
the

courts

transcript,

it

is

apparent

tax

escrow

In looking at

that

the

courts

construction was founded upon its judicial notice; therefore, the
error was prejudicial to appellant.
B.
A

Modification;
modification

occurs

when

parties

rights

are

either

extended beyond or reduced from those originally intended in the
decree.

In Re Jarvis, 792 P.2d 1259 (Wash. App. 1990).

In this

case prior to the courts construction, property taxes were not
mentioned whatsoever in the courts decree.

As construed the

decree now allocates property taxes between the parties.
entire

new

category

of

debt;

ie, property

An

taxes, has been

inserted into the decree and enforced. The court intended only to
grant judgment upon the complaint as prayed.

Given that property

taxes were omitted entirely from the complaint, the inclusion
later

of

real

property

taxes goes beyond

the pleadings and

default decree resulting in an extension of the parties rights.
The court by extending appellees rights without petition, trial
and proof of a material change of circumstance €*rred.

10

CONCLUSION
The court should not have construed the parties decree.
decree is enforceable as written.

The

Appellee in her divorce

complaint failed to include a request to allocate real property
taxes.

At the time of the decree, the circumstances presumed the

real property would be sold in a relative short time.
circumstances
changes

to

changed;
the

circumstances.

decree
The

therefore,
to

court

appellee

allocate

taxes

in construing

sought
given

the

These

equitable
these

default

new

decree

extended the decree debt allocation to comport with the new
change of circumstances resulting in a modification.
Wherefore, appellant prays the courts order be reversed and
the case be remanded for appellee to file a petition to modify if
she so chooses.
DATED this 12th day of May, 1993.

DAVID J.^BEtfCEAU
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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9
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING
10

11

September 24, 1992

12
13

BEFORE COMMISSIONER ARNETTE

14
15
16
17

A P P E A R A N C E S:
For the Plaintiff:

Jane Allen, Esq.

For the Defendant:

David Berceau, Esq.

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101

\

P R O C E E D I N G S

1
2

THE COURT:

Forsman vs. Forsman.

3

MS. ALLEN:

This is our Order to Show Cause

4

and we've prepared an exhibit that has been given to Mr.

5

Berceau.

6

THE COURT:

Thank you.

7

MS. ALLEN:

A lot of things have changed

8

since the Order to Show Cause was filed.

9

would like to do is make a motion to continue the order to

As a result what I

10

show cause.

I think Mr. Berceau agrees with that.

However,

11

it would be helpful for us in. increasing our chances that we

12

might resolve this by ourselves without actually coming back

13

to court if we argue one issue.
What we have is a house that was in the possession

14
15

of the defendant.

He was supposed to pay the monthly

16

expenses.

17

it.

18

when it came to the point that that balloon payment was due,

19

the plaintiff's parents gave her money to pay off the

20

balloon payment so that it wouldn't affect their credit and

21

so that then they could take possession of the house and

22

sell it since the defendant hadn't done so in a period over

23

three years.

24

have a renter there that is hopefully will be in the first

25

of October and they have paid payments since they took over

That's what the decree says on the house and sell

He didn't do so.

There was a balloon payment due and

They now have possession of the house and they

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101

the house in May of this year.
When they took over possession of the house they
discovered that the property taxes had not been paid since
the time of the divorce.

Three thousand of those were

accrued during the parties' marriage in 1988. We agree that
each party would need to pay half of that.

The issue we

can't agree on is whether or not Mr. Forsman should be
liable for all of the property taxes or whether the parties
should split them when the decree says that he will be
responsible for the monthly expenses and utilities thereon.
It turns out that the property taxes were not taken out of
the —

were not included in the mortgage payment so he

didn't pay them.
Our position is that he does owe them, that he was
in possession of the house, that he was dilatory in selling
it.

He claims to have listed it. No offers were ever made.

We have no idea what he did.

Common sense says he couldn't

have or else it would have sold.

If it wouldn't sell for

enough to cover the outstanding obligations, that still
doesn't mean he couldn't present an offer and the parties
couldn't decide whether to kick in the difference.
it just sat and sat and sat.

Instead

So we believe that he was

dilatory in selling it and that because he had possession of
it and because the decree says that he should pay the
monthly expenses that that would include the property tax
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101

0005R

1

and he would owe the difference between the $3,011.68 and

2

the $10,634 which is the part that was accrued while he

3

alone was in possession of the house.
We have other expenses that we won't know the

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

total result until the house is sold.

There is an offer on

the house but you never know if they're going to go through
or not until they actually do, and what we would hope to do
is either resolve it between ourselves or come back when the
house is, in fact, sold so we know what that amount of money
was and what was covered by the sale on the house and what
wasn't.

We don't really know what our shortfall will be

just yet so it makes it difficult to figure out exactly what
the defendant would owe the plaintiff.
I think it would be also helpful to have some
guidance from the Commissioner as to —
defendant's theory that when her —

apparently the

when plaintiff took over

the house and paid off the loan then it's her house and it's
her problem and he doesn't owe anything any more.

I see

this as the same sort of situation as any other co-signing
like on a car.

The decree says the parties are supposed to

do something and then if the item is foreclosed or the loan
becomes due or the parents in this case come and take it
over, I cannot imagine that that means the defendant is now
off the hook and doesn't owe at least half of the reasonable
expenses to pay the payments and get it sold and get it

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101

cleaned up.
He was ordered in the decree to keep the house in
good condition.

He has failed to do so and because of all

of that, there will be further expenses in getting this
house sold.

We think he is responsible for those.

It's

clear that the defendant doesn't think he is and it would
help to have some guidance on that issue also.
So if we could have some guidance as to
interpreting the decree as to the property taxes and whether
or not he is still liable for expenses on the house even
though the damages have been mitigated by the other party
that would also be helpful.
THE COURT:

Thank you, Ms. Allen. Mr.

Berceau.
MR. BERCEAU:

Yes, Your Honor.

First as to

whether or not he can be liable for expenses in the future,
it is my impression that that's what we are continuing and
if the court gives guidance I am continuing nothing.
mean, there's nothing for me to continue.

I

So I would move

the court that I believe that there's an agreement that as
to that issue, that's been continued and we're going to
determine what the expenses are and wrestle over them later.
With respect to the home.

The divorce decree at

paragraph 5 provides that defendant shall be required to
maintain the house and yard in a clean and neat condition.
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101

nnnco

1

I And then it says that when they sell the home the debts to

2

the IRS and Utah State can be paid from the proceeds of the

3

home and they'll share equally in any proceeds if there is
anything left and defendant shall be responsible for all
monthly payments and utilities.

That's it.

silent as to who's going to pay the taxes.
whatsoever in it.

This decree is
There's nothing

In this situation, Your Honor, my client

would testify that the taxes have never been paid on this
g

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25

piece of property by either party while they lived there,
The evidence would show that they lost the business.
had a bankruptcy and they also lost their home —

They

it was

foreclosed by WestOne Bank and then sold back to them and as
part of the sale back there were four mortgagees.
would be her two parents and them.

And that

So there were four co-

makers on a note, four tenants in common or joint tenants
I haven't seen the deed —

—

who owned this piece of property.

So we don't have your typical situation where mom and pop
are guaranteeing the kids' loan.

These are not children.

Those four people never as owners paid the taxes
on the property.

Now I think by the divorce decree the

plaintiff and defendant bound themselves between them two to
split the obligation if it's not taken care of when the
house is sold, but they're asking for this court to add
phrases and interpret a decree by basically retroactively
modifying it to insert provisions to say what happens to
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1

taxes when there is nothing in there to say what happens to

2

taxes.

3

pay the bills equally 50-50.

4

interpret that to include taxes.

5

add phrases into a decree to provide for taxes being paid by

6

my client who, by the way, also rented the property out as

7

one of the owners while he as there.

8

property who are liable for taxes, not the person who is

9

possessing it.

What's in the decree, it says that they're going to
I think the court can
The court shouldn't go and

It's the owners of the

The tax issue is they should obviously owe

10

it equally together and then deal with the other two co-

11

makers maybe separately in a lawsuit if they have to as some

12

type of partner.

13

something that was never traditionally paid.

14

foreclosed in the first place, they picked up all the taxes

15

that they had never paid before.

16

paid and for some reason the County only shows '88 to date

17

as being the taxes owing.

18

and urge the court not to interpret the decree by inserting

19

terms in there that aren't there or the court would really

20

have to go a long way to interpret.

But to hold him having to pay for
When the bank

The rest of '87 were never

So we disagree with that position

As to expenses on the home, the note matured in

21
22

May.

All four people signed the note.

As of that time they

23

either sell it beforehand or they get foreclosed again or

24

they loose possession and ownership of their home.

25

client quitclaimed a deed after the note matured because her

My
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1 parents came in and paid off the home.
2

the home back then.

3

became the owners.

4

That was a sale of

When they paid off that note, they

We need to also see the deed and see what's

5

happened on that.

6

hold him liable for future expenses for something he's not

7

on the title to.

8

been a sale.

9
10
11

I don't think the court should try to

A matured note has occurred and there's

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Berceau.

Ms.

Allen, anything further?
MS. ALLEN:

Yes, I have a tax ledger showing

12

that the property taxes for 1987 were in fact paid and if

13

you'll notice the paragraph in the decree says plaintiff is

14

responsible for one-half of the monthly payment on the prior

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

bankruptcy, half of the debt to the State of Utah and the
IRS and any debts in her name and that's all.

It doesn't

say that she'll pay half of the property taxes when the
property was sold.
THE COURT:

Thank you, Ms. Allen.

make my recommendation as follows.

Let me

I've read the decree and

I think the crucial language is what both counsel have
referred me to.

The defendant shall be responsible for all

monthly payments and utilities on the home until it is sold
holding the plaintiff harmless therefrom.

The court can

take judicial knowledge of the fact that mortgage companies
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1

and lending institutions routinely treat both taxes and

2

insurance as monthly expenses even though due only once per

3

year.

4

even though it is payable only once per year.

5

the defendant had the benefit of the use of the home while

6

he occupied it and the use of the rental income when he

7

rented it.

8

decree, it does delineate what the debts are that each party

9

is to pay and it does not refer to the property taxes.

It's an ongoing expense related to home ownership
And further

Finally on the provision concerning debts of the

For all of those reasons I believe that the

10
11

defendant should be liable for the property taxes for the

12

time that he had possession and the use of the rental
income.

13

recommendation regarding the extent of the defendant's

14

liability for any other expenses associated with the home.

15

I will state for the purpose of guidance only that if the

16
17

I think that it's speculative for me to make any

plaintiff suffers damage as a result of the defendant's
failure to comply with the decree of divorce, the case law

18

certainly authorizes the court to make the plaintiff whole,

19

So if that will provide you with any guidance, so be it.

20

At this time I'll return, Ms. Allen, your two

21
22

documents to you for use in further hearings if necessary

23

and I'll ask that you prepare an appropriate order.

24 I
25

—

MR. BERCEAU:

Can the court give us any dates

is it from the time of the decree forward?
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THE COURT:

1

From the time of the decree until

2

the defendant no longer had either possession or use of the

3

rental income.

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage;
(i) incurable insanity; or
(j) when the husband and wife have lived separately under a decree of separate maintenance of
any state for three consecutive years without cohabitation.
(4) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection
(3)(j) does not affect the liability of either party under
any provision for separate maintenance previously
granted.
(5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the
grounds of insanity unless: (1) the defendant has
been adjudged insane by the appropriate authorities of this or another state prior to the commencement of the action; and (ii) the court finds
by the testimony of competent witnesses that the
insanity of the defendant is incurable.
(b) The court shall appoint for the defendant a
guardian ad litem, who shall protect the interests
of the defendant. A copy of the summons and
complaint shall be served on the defendant in
person or by publication, as provided by the laws
of this state in other actions for divorce, or upon
his guardian ad litem, and upon the county attorney for the county where the action is prosecuted.
(c) The county attorney shall investigate the
merits of the case and if the defendant resides out
of this state, take depositions as necessary, attend the proceedings, and make a defense as is
just to protect the rights of the defendant and the
interests of the state.
(d) In all actions the court and judge have jurisdiction over the payment of alimony, the distribution of property, and the custody and maintenance of minor children, as the courts and
judges possess in other actions for divorce.
(e) The plaintiff or defendant may, if the defendant resides in this state, upon notice, have
the defendant brought into the court at trial, or
have an examination of the defendant by two or
more competent physicians, to determine the
mental condition of the defendant. For this purpose either party may have leave from the court
to enter any asylum or institution where the defendant may be confined. The costs of court in
this action shall be apportioned by the court. 1987
30-3-2. Right of h u s b a n d to divorce.
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from
his wife for the same causes and in the same manner
as the wife may obtain a divorce from her husband.
1953

30-3-3. Temporary alimony and suit money.
The court may order either party to pay to the clerk
a sum of money for the separate support and maintenance of the adverse party and the children, and to
enable such party to prosecute or defend the action.
1953

30-3-4.

P l e a d i n g s — Findings — Decree — Sealing.
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and
signed by the plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney.
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted
upon default or otherwise except upon legal evidence taken in the cause.
(c) If the plaintiff and the defendant have a
child or children and the plaintiff has filed an
action in the judicial district as defined in Section 78-1-2.1 where the pilot program shall be
administered, a decree of divorce may not be
granted until both parties have attended a man-

datory course provided in Section 30-3-11.3 and
have presented a certificate of course completion
to the court. The court may waive this requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one
of the parties, if it determines course attendance
and completion are not necessary, appropriate,
feasible, or in the best interest of the parties.
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be
held before the court or the court commissioner
as provided by Section 78-3-31 and rules of the
Judicial Council. The court or the commissioner
in all divorce cases shall make and file findings
and decree upon the evidence.
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be
sealed by order of the court upon the motion of either
party. The sealed portion of the file is available to the
public only upon an order of the court. The concerned
parties, the attorneys of record or attorney filing a
notice of appearance in the action, the Office of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied for or is receiving public assistance, or the court
have full access to the entire record. This sealing does
not apply to subsequent filings to enforce or amend
the decree.
1992
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4.

Repealed.

1990

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance
and health care of parties and children
— Division of debts — Court to have
continuing jurisdiction — Custody and
visitation — Termination of alimony —
Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court
may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The
court shall include the following in every decree of
divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the
payment of reasonable and necessary medical
and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
and
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify
respective creditors or obligees, regarding
the court's division of debts, obligations, or
liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of
these orders.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining
child support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial
parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an
order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide the
day care for the dependent children, necessitated by
the employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and

30-3-5-1

HUSBAND AND WIFE

maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and
dental care, or the distribution of the property and
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents,
grandparents, and other relatives, the court shall
consider the welfare of the child.
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However,
if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab
initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party
paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined.
(6) Any order of t h e court that a party pay alimony
to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by
the party paying alimony t h a t t h e former spouse is
residing with a person of t h e opposite sex. However, if
it is further established by t h e person receiving alimony t h a t t h a t relationship or association is without
any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a court order is made
and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in t h a t action, if the court determines
t h a t the petition was without merit and not asserted
in good faith.
1991
30-3-5.1.

P r o v i s i o n for income withholding in

child support order.
Whenever a court enters a n order for child support,
it shall include in t h e order a provision for withholding income a s a m e a n s of collecting child support a s
provided in Title 78, Chapter 45d.
i»85
30-3-5.2. Allegations of child abuse or child sexual abuse — Investigation.
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request
for modification of a divorce decree, an allegation of
child abuse or child sexual abuse is made, implicating
either party, the court shall order that an investigation be conducted by the Division of Family Services
within the Department of Human Services in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 4, Part 5. A final
award of custody or visitation may not be rendered
until a report on that investigation is received by the
court. That investigation shall be conducted by the
Division of Family Services within 30 days of the
court's notice and request for an investigation. In reviewing this report, the court shall comply with Section 78-7-9.
1992
30-3-5.5. Petition to protect abused child — Jurisdiction under this chapter.
(1)A person who has filed a complaint under this
chapter may also file a petition with the district court
for a protective order for the protection of any children residing with either party to the action under
this chapter. The petition and procedures shall be the
same as for the issuance of protective orders in the
juvenile court under Sections 78-3a-20.5, 78-3a-20.6,
78-3a-20.7, 78-3a-20.8, 78-3a-20.9, and 78-3a-20.10.
The court or the cohabitant may use the protections
provided in this chapter and Title 78, Chapter 3a,
Juvenile Courts, and when necessary, those protections under Title 76, Chapter 5, Offenses Against the
Person, which provide for criminal prosecution.
(2) A person who has obtained a protective order
±*~:
~4.;«„ cVioii nntifv a n v other court
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pertaining to t h e same family member named in t h e
protective order.
1991
30-3-6. Repealed.

1985

30-3-7. When decree b e c o m e s absolute.
(1) T h e decree of divorce becomes absolute:
(a) on the date it is signed by t h e court a n d
entered by t h e clerk in t h e register of actions if
both the parties who have a child or children and
the plaintiff h a s filed a n action in t h e judicial
district as defined in Section 78-1-2.1 where t h e
pilot program is administered a n d have completed attendance a t t h e mandatory course provided in Section 30-3-11.3 except if t h e court
waives the requirement, on its own motion or on
the motion of one of the parties, upon determination t h a t course attendance a n d completion a r e
not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in t h e
best interest of t h e parties;
(b) a t t h e expiration of a period of time t h e
court m a y specifically designate, unless a n appeal or other proceedings for review a r e pending;
or
(c) when the court, before t h e decree becomes
absolute, for sufficient cause otherwise orders.
(2) T h e court, upon application or on its own motion for good cause shown, m a y waive, alter, or extend a designated period of time before t h e decree
becomes absolute, but not to exceed six months from
the signing and entry of the decree.
1992
30-3-8. Remarriage — When unlawful.
Neither party to a divorce proceeding which dissolves their marriage by decree m a y m a r r y a n y person other t h a n the spouse from whom the divorce was
granted until it becomes absolute. If a n appeal is
taken, t h e divorce is not absolute until after affirmance of the decree.
i98S
30-3-9. Repealed.

1969

30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or divorce — Custody consideration.
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children
are separated, or their marriage is declared void or
dissolved, the court shall m a k e a n order for the future
care and custody of the minor children a s it considers
appropriate. In determining custody, t h e court shall
consider t h e best interests of t h e child a n d t h e past
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of
the parties. The court may inquire of the children and
t a k e into consideration t h e children's desires regarding t h e future custody, b u t t h e expressed desires a r e
not controlling and the court may determine t h e children's custody otherwise.
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider,
among other factors the court finds relevant, which
parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the
child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the
court finds appropriate.
1988
30-3-10.1. Joint legal custody defined.
In this chapter, "joint legal custody":

(1) means the sharing of the rights, privileges,
duties, and powers of a parent by both parents,
where specified;
(2) may include a n award of exclusive authority by t h e court to one parent to m a k e specific
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Rule 105. Limited admissibility.
When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but
not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the
court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct
the jury accordingly.
Advisory Committee Note. — This provision is the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable to Rule 6, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971). This rule is to be read in conjunction
with Rule 20(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
concerning separate trials and Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-21-44(a) (1953) [repealed
- s e e now § 77-8a-l] concerning severance,
and with the caveat that a limiting instruction
may be illusory at best, particularly in a complextnalorminwhichtheevtden^esubstantially consists of inferences, presumptions or
NOTES TO

circumstantial evidence. The danger of prejudice may also be greater in criminal cases,
where life and liberty may be at stake. Cf.
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,
762-63 (1946). See also Terry v Z.C.M.I., 605
p 2 d 314 (Utah 1979). The matter is addressed
to t h e d l s c r e t I O n of the trial judge,
Cross-References. - Instructions to jury,
p„ie 5 1 T J R C P
«
' * . \ " ^ ,
, jnn_.
nn„ N
„ * £ ? * ££"•. R u l e S 2 0 ( b ) a n d 42(b)"
'
'-oa-i.
DECISIONS

Cited in Hill v. Hartog, 658 P.2d 1206 (Utah
1983); State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106 (Utah
1985).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence
§§ 262, 263.
C.J.S. — 23 C J.S. Criminal Law § 972 et
seq.; 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 186.

Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=» 338(4),
368, 422 to 428, 507 to 512; Evidence <s=> 148.

Rule 106. Remainder of or related writings or recorded
statements.
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a
party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other
part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be
considered contemporaneously with it.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim. Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) was not as specific, but Rule 106
is otherwise in accord with Utah practice.

Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October 1, 1992, revised this
rule to make the language gender-neutral,

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evidence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 73.

ARTICLE II.
JUDICIAL NOTICE.
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative
facts.
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not.
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a
Darty and supplied with the necessary information.
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an
>pportunity to be heard as to thp nmn^n+« ~r x 1 •
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tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request
may be made after judicial notice has been taken.
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the
proceeding.
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal
case, the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept
as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and consolidates the
law of judicial notice formerly contained in
Rules 9 through 12, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971) and in Utah Code Annotated, § 78-24-1
[78-25-1] (1953) [superseded by this rule] into
one broadly defined rule. The Utah Supreme
Court has stated the rule with reference to judicial notice in Little Cottonwood Water Co. v.
Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 267, 289 Pac. 116 (1930)
where the court stated: "In short, a court is
presumed to know what every man of ordinary
intelligence must know about such things."
See also DeFusion Co. v. Utah Liquor Control
Comm'n, 613 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1980).
Subdivision (a) "governs only judicial notice
of adjudicative facts," and does not deal with
instances in which a court may notice legislative facts, which is left to the sound discretion
of trial and appellate courts. Compare Rule 12,
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). Since legislative facts are matters that go to the policy of a
rule of law as distinct from the true facts that
are used in the adjudication of a controversy
they are not appropriate for a rule of evidence
and best left to the law-making considerations
by appellate and trial courts.
Subdivision (b) is in accord with the Little
Cottonwood Water Co. case, supra, and the
substance of Rule 9(1) and (2), Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971). Utah law presumes that the
law of another jurisdiction is the same as that
of the State of Utah and judicial notice has
been taken from the law of other states and
foreign countries. Lamberth v. Lamberth, 550
P.2d 200 (Utah 1976); Maple v. Maple, 566
P.2d 1229 (Utah 1977). The Utah court has
taken judicial notice under Rule 9(2), Utah
Rules of Evidence (1971) of the rules and regulations of the Tax Commission. Nelson v. State
Tax Comm'n, 29 Utah 2d 162, 506 P.2d 437
(1973). The broad language of subdivision (b) is
identical to Rule 201 of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence (1974). Judicial notice of foreign law

is permissible under this rule. Provisions of
this rule supersede Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-25-1 (1953), since the statute is merely
illustrative of items encompassed within the
broad framework of this rule. The foreign law
of some jurisdictions might best be left to proof
through witnesses if the resort to sources available in the State of Utah is questionable.
Subdivision (c) is discretionary, but subdivision (d) requires the court to take judicial notice if requested by a party and if supplied with
the necessary information to make a determination of whether to take judicial notice. Compare Rules 9(2) and 10(3), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). The committee believes that Rule
201(d) simplifies the process of taking judicial
notice of adjudicative facts by making it mandatory when a party makes a request therefor
and supplies the court with the necessary information.
Subdivision (e) is similar to Rule 10(1), (2)
and (3), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Subdivision (g) is in accord with Rule 11,
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). The provision
that in a criminal case the court shall instruct
the jury that it may but is not required to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed
has no counterpart in Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971). Accord, State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah
323, 234 P.2d 600 (1951). See also Amendment
VI, Constitution of the United States.
Cross-References. — Court to impart matters of judicial knowledge to jury, § 78-21-3.
Jury bound to accept declaration of judicial
knowledge, § 78-21-3.
Municipalities, notice of existence and classification, § 10-2-306.
Ordinance or private statute, notice of, Rule
9(i), U.R.C.P.
Seal of industrial commission, notice of,
§ 35-1-8.
Seal of public service commission, notice of,
§ 54-1-4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Appeals.
Effect of judicial notice.
Kinds of facts.
—Administrative agency records.
—Agriculture.
—Bookkeeping methods.
—Climate.
—Court records and other matters relating to
courts.
—Decisions of other courts.
—Drainage district.

—Foreign law.
—History, economics and geography.
—Horse racing and gambling.
—Indian law.
—Intoxicating liquor.
—Legislative journals.
—Medical matters.
—Municipalities.
Incorporation.
Ordinances.
—Property boundaries.
—Railroads.

Kule 6-403. Shortening 90-day waiting period in domestic
matters.
Intent:
To establish a procedure for shortening or waiving the 90-day waiting period in domestic cases.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the district courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Proceedings on the merits of a divorce action shall not be heard by the
district courts unless 90 days have elapsed from the time the complaint was
filed or unless the Court finds that there is good cause for shortening or
eliminating the waiting period and enters a formal order to that effect prior to
the hearing date.
(2) Application for a hearing less than 90 days from the date the complaint
was filed shall be made by motion and accompanied by an affidavit setting
forth the factual matters constituting good cause. The motion and supporting
affidavit(s) shall be served on the opposing party at least five days prior to the
scheduled hearing unless the party is in default.
(3) In the event the Court finds that there is good cause for hearing in less
than 90 days from the filing of the complaint, the facts constituting such cause
shall be included in the findings of fact and presented to the Court for signature.

Rule 6-404. Modification of divorce decrees.
Intent:
To establish procedures for modification of existing divorce decrees.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all district courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Proceedings to modify a divorce decree shall be commenced by the filing
of a petition to modify in the original divorce action. Service of the petition
and summons upon the opposing party shall be in accordance with the requirements of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. No request for a
modification of an existing decree shall be raised by way of an order to show
cause.
(2) The responding party shall serve the reply within twenty days after
service of the petition. Either party may file a certificate of readiness for trial.
Upon filing of the certificate, the matter shall be referred to the domestic
relations commissioner prior to trial, or in those districts where there is not a
domestic relations commissioner, placed on the trial calendar.
(3) No petition for modification shall be placed on a law and motion or order
to show cause calendar without the consent of the commissioner or the district
judge.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Modification of support.
Subject matter jurisdiction.
Modification of support
Plaintiff was required to file a petition to
modify her divorce decree pursuant to this rule
when she sought to enforce, by order to show
cause, a provision in the decree that provided

that future child support would be automatically adjusted to reflect changes in income.
Such a provision violates § 78-45-7(1), which
provides that a child support order can only be
modified based upon a showing of a material
change in circumstances. Grover v. Grover,
839 P.2d 871 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Subject matter jurisdiction.
A district court other than the court issuing

